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Tomerlin: Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954

FLORIDA WHITES AND THE BROWN
DECISION OF 1954
by J OSEPH A. T OMBERLIN *

U
S
Supreme Court delivered its epochal
Topinion
in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
HE

NITED

TATES

on May 17, 1954. Chief Justice Earl Warren, only recently confirmed by the senate, read the unanimous decision, which held
that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate
but equal’ has no place.” The plaintiffs in the suit, subjected
to racially segregated systems of education, were thereby “deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” But then the court postponed implementing its decree to hear more arguments in the next session
on the question of when and how segregation should end.1
In its direct application, the Brown case pertained only to
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, the defendant
states in the litigation. Clearly, though, the court’s announcement that “segregation is a denial of the equal protection of
the laws” encompassed all states that either required or permitted separate educations for blacks and whites.2 Florida was
such a state, supporting a dual school system in which contact
between races was virtually non-existent.3 During the 1953-1954
academic year 645,136 children attended publicly-supported
schools in Florida. Of that number, 503,513 were whites and
* Mr. Tomberlin is associate professor of history, Valdosta State College,
Valdosta, Georgia.

1.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483-495 (1954); Washington Post, May 18, 1954; New York Times, May 18, 1954. See also
Congressional Quarterly (June 4, 1954), 689-90; William Barry Furlong,
“The Case of Linda Brown,” New York Times Magazine (February 12,
1961), 63; Lee O. Garber, “Evolution in Judicial Thinking,” The
Nation’s Schools, LIV (July 1954), 32, 80-84; Albert P. Blaustein and
Clarence C. Ferguson, Desegregation and the Law (New Brunswick,
1957), 46-47; Thomas I. Emerson, David Haber, and Norman Dorsen,
Political and Civil Rights in the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1967).
II. 1615-21.
2. 347 U.S. 495.
3. Florida Constitution (1885), Art. XII, Sec. 12; Florida Acts and Resolutions (1895), 96; Florida State Department of Education, Florida School
Laws (1955), 883.
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142,623 blacks. Blacks comprised 22.1 per cent of the total
school enrollment. There were, in addition, 19,963 white and
5,079 black teachers in the state.4 A rapidly increasing population compounded the problem in Florida. Whereas the 1950
census had counted 2,771,305 inhabitants, the Florida State
Board of Health estimated in 1954 that the number had climbed
to 3,481,528.5
Florida made little, if any, preparation prior to May 17 for
the possible invalidation of school segregation. One observer
reported rather vaguely that the only steps taken in anticipation
of the ruling dealt with “stocktaking and discussions on the
philosophical level among state school officials and certain planning groups.“6 Members of the legislature avowed that they
did not discuss preservation of the traditional school establishment at all during the 1953 session.7
Florida’s initial reaction to the decree was mild.8 Officials
issued few denunciations of the type loudly shouted in neighboring states. Herman Talmadge, governor of nearby Georgia,
charged that the court had “blatantly ignored all law and
precedent and [had] usurped from the Congress and the people
the power to amend the Constitution and from Congress the
authority to make the laws of the land.” Talmadge claimed
that the constitution was now a “mere scrap of paper.” United
States Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia called the Brown
9
opinion “a flagrant abuse of judicial power.“ No similar statement emanated from anyone in Florida government. According
to one black commentator, one heard indistinct rumblings from
4. Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Florida
(1954), 14, 16.
5. H. S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1957), 12; Florida State Board of
Health, Florida Vital Statistics (1954), iii.
6. Southern School News, September 3, 1954. Published monthly at Nashville, Tennessee, from September 1954, to June 1965, it contains data
on the aftermath of the Brown decision. The reporter for Florida was
Bert Collier, editorial writer for the Miami Herald. After discontinuing
Southern School News in June 1965, the parent organization, the
Southern Education Reporting Service, remained in existence until
August 1969. See “Mission Accomplished,” Newsweek (August 11, 1969),
38.
7. Southern School News, September 3, 1954.
8. Ibid.
9. Atlanta Constitution, May 18, 1954; Southern School News, September 3,
1954; Congressional Quarterly (May 21, 1954), 637; (June 4, 1954), 689.
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“fringe areas,” but most responsible sources received the decision as if they had expected it.10
Among the early responses to the court’s action was that of
the Florida Continuing Educational Council, a semi-official
body of business and professional men established in 1932 by a
resolution of the Florida Education Association to serve as a
source of lay advice on educational problems. At a meeting
attended by Attorney General Richard W. Ervin and Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey the council resolved to use every legal means to delay desegregation of state
schools. But council members did not favor closing schools;
they agreed that “any attempt to do away with the public
school system to circumvent the Supreme Court was unthinkable.“11
Newspaper editorials represented an especially important
form of reaction to the supreme court’s edict. Nearly every
journal in Florida commented on the matter, and generally,
editorial remarks reflected restraint and reason. The Orlando
Sentinel pointed out that the Brown decision was now the law
of the land and should command obedience, even though the
supreme court had not yet set up machinery for enforcing its
verdict. How segregation would terminate remained to be decided later, and, the Sentinel forecast, it would take “some time
to eliminate segregation no matter how unconstitutional.“12
“No surprise” the St. Augustine Record termed the desegregation order. It was “the most momentous judicial decision of our
times and it . . . left the South with enormous social, economic
and political questions to answer.” The court’s action would
throw together black and white youth who would have to adjust to each other and solve problems which had already proved
insoluble for the South’s political leaders. Above all, desegregation must not become a political issue, and its coming must
be attended by “reason and [regard for] the public’s welfare.”
10.

R. W. Puryear, “Desegregation of Public Education in Florida— One Year
Afterward,” Journal of Negro Education, XXIV (Summer 1955), 220.
11. Southern School News, September 3, 1954; Florida Education Association, History of the Florida Education Association, 1886-87 to 1956-57
(Tallahassee, 1958), 196; “Continuing Education Council Report on
Segregation,” The Journal of the Florida Education Association, XXXII
(September 1954), 10.
12. Orlando Sentinel, May 18, 1954.
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Because a final settlement was not yet in sight the greatest need
at the moment was for “calm, deliberate thought.“13
Sarasota’s Herald-Tribune professed that the death of the
“separate but equal” doctrine had been inevitable since the
supreme court first began to produce “liberal” judicial interpretations in the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. The
appointment of “left-of-center” Earl Warren as chief justice
marked the decisive step which made reversal absolutely unavoidable. Now, not only was separation of the races illegal,
but the whole concept of states rights might well be moribund.
If an individual state did not have the final word in operating
its schools, then it followed logically that the state did not
possess ultimate authority in any other field.14 In a somewhat
fatalistic tone, the Gainesville Daily Sun predicted vast changes
in school operations were coming “as surely as day follows
night.” Change was, in reality, the only choice. The Sun expressed its hope that the “new arrangements” would work out
to the best advantage of all the state’s citizens.15
The Daily News of Fort Lauderdale hopefully insisted that
a segregated school system would continue in local Broward
County “without running afoul of the Supreme Court decision.”
The journal based its optimism on an extant state law which
provided that students attend schools nearest their homes. Because Florida had built black schools largely to serve only
black residential areas, there was every reason to assume that
desegregation would not be required. Then, the Daily News
retreated and contradicted its own statements. “Whether
southerners agree with the Supreme Court justices or not is a
moot question,” said the newspaper, “because there is no appeal
from their decision and no likelihood of any change.“16 According to the Fort Pierce News-Tribune, the Brown opinion
was not “unexpected.” The justices, in declaring segregation
unconstitutional, had rendered a “decision more radical, more
sweeping in its implications, and more momentous in its actual
application than any other during the present century.” The
court had ruled on the basis of a “concept of abstract and
13. St. Augustine Record, May 19, 1954.
14. Sarasota Herald-Tribune, May 20, 1954.
15. Gainesville Daily Sun, May 18, 1954.
16. Fort Lauderdale Daily News, May 18, 1954.
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theoretical justice” which took no account of the “real and
practical problems” the South confronted. Essentially, the supreme court had endeavored to “legislate a mode of human
conduct,” an exceptionally hazardous undertaking. And the
tribunal had acted without regard to the “tremendous progress”
the South had made in curing its racial ills.17
The Florida Alligator, student newspaper of the University
of Florida, suggested that the one point everyone had overlooked in the aftermath of the Brown ruling was the “teacher’s
position.” Large numbers of white teachers would probably refuse to instruct Negro students in mixed classes, thereby finding
themselves forced out of their profession. This publication
urged that the “words cautious and reserved. . . be considered
with every action,” and concluded, “this is not just another
court ruling; it is history in the making and a law that will
always stand for the world to see.“18 From Fort Myers, the
News-Press foresaw that the Brown case augured “a great disruption” in all school systems practicing racial segregation. The
publication cautioned that one could gain little by “hot-headed
denunciations of the ruling or by rash proposals for defying it.”
Rather, the present crisis demanded “thoughtful study” to determine how the “‘inevitable disruption” might be minimized.
As other newspapers did, the News-Press praised the court for
not ordering immediate desegregation of southern schools.19
The Daytona Beach Evening News speculated that the decision had settled “‘for all time” the fate of public school segregation. The opinion was beneficial for all Americans; resistance
to desegregation would bring only “loss of time, money and
morale.” Henceforth, administrators should plan public school
systems “in conformity with the ruling.” Those states which
acted swiftly to desegregate would profit most; the losers would
be those which lagged behind in opening white schools to black
students.20 DeLand’s Sun News echoed the sentiments of other
state newspapers. It stressed that even a cursory reading of the
opinion made clear that no abrupt or extensive changes in education would occur. Therefore, this was not time for “oratorical
17. Fort Pierce News Tribune, May 20, 1954.
18. University of Florida, The Florida Alligator, May 21, 1954.
19. Fort Myers News-Press, May 18, 1954.
20. Daytona Beach Evening News, May 18, 1954.

Published by STARS, 1972

5

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 51 [1972], No. 1, Art. 4
F LORIDA WHITES

AND THE

Brown D ECISION

27

fireworks.” Nor should an extraordinary session of the legislature meet, for such a session would not possess sufficient information upon which to base a proper course of action. Rather,
people at the present moment should talk little but think a
great deal, and all should control any penchant for “impulsive
speech or action.“21
Clearwater’s Sun propounded the thesis that the court, by
overruling segregation, had created a social problem “worthy
of the best minds of both Negro and white races in the South.”
The author of the editorial, calling himself “Colonel Clearwater,” asserted that Pinellas County had an opportunity to
get “ahead of the game” by fashioning a workable method to
carry out desegregation. Defiance, on the other hand, would
lead to calamity. Wrote “Colonel Clearwater”: “As a parting
thought, it occurs to me that if the South works out this problem intelligently, historians in years to come will consider the
Supreme Court’s ruling a great milestone in obliterating racial
prejudice from the earth.“22 The Palatka Daily News declared
that the court had long since abandoned “time tested legal concepts” to utilize “yardsticks of social desirability” in its decisions.
Now, with the Brown opinion, the court had “really pulled one
out of the hat.” The South had made marvelous racial progress
in the previous few years but not enough for the “professional
white liberals and the professional Negro champions.” The
edict was bound to curb those advances, and it could therefore
be only a “pyrrhic victory.” The inequality of educational
facilities would have been firm ground for the Brown opinion,
“but to hold that because something is separate it is less than
something else is asinine.“23
Editorializing on the Brown case, the Miami Daily News
reminded its readers of a speech which Superintendent of Public
Instruction Bailey had made in Miami the previous April.
Appearing before the state convention of the Florida Education Association, the superintendent had claimed that the litigation then pending before the supreme court would have no
effect on Florida. Desegregation would commence in the state
only after the passage of considerable time. Because of the dis21. DeLand Sun News, May 19, 1954.
22. Clearwater Sun, May 18, 1954.
23. Palatka Daily News, May 18, 1954.
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tinct possibility of long delay in implementing the decision, the
Daily News concluded, “Today the only reaction is one of
calm.“24 The Herald, another Miami daily, described the decree
as “sweeping, unanimous and unequivocal,” and it noted that
postponing the start of desegregation was acknowledgment of
the complexity of the question. As for Florida, now that the
court had determined the law, the state would adapt to its
new situation “sanely, judiciously and humanely.“25
St. Petersburg’s Times believed that “this new concept. . .
[was] not a difficult legal or social, or psychological theory to
follow.” White readers had only to consider the damage to their
own “sense of self-confidence and security” if they too had
suffered exclusion from certain schools and public facilities
their entire lives. The supreme court had now realized that
segregation harmed the dignity of those who were segregated,
that it deprived them of “something just as real and valuable
to them as property itself.” Popular opinion in the last twenty
years had cleared the way for the decision; indeed, popular
opinion had made practicable a “massive rejection of the idea
that segregation is compatible with American political, social,
26
The Jacksonville Florida Timesand religious ideas.“
Union insisted that the South could not resolve its racial problems in the near future, no matter what “abstract justice the
court thinks may be achieved.” No discernible shift in southern
racial attitudes and no quick change in the South’s existing
biracial educational system would occur. Moreover, the true
decision as to the practicality of desegregation rested with the
people themselves. In the meantime, the Times-Union urged
that Floridians confine themselves to “calm, deliberate
thought.“27
“[D]eplorable to the extent that it is disruptive of law,
custom, and the social order in those states that have maintained segregation” was the Tampa Morning Tribune’s evaluation of the ruling. Yet, the Tribune admitted that careful
perusal of the fourteenth amendment should suffice to convince
anyone that the supreme court’s action was inescapable. The
24. Miami Daily News, n.d., quoted in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 18,
1954.
25. Miami Herald, May 18, 1954.
26. St. Petersburg Times, May 18, 1954.
27. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 19, 1954.
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paper counseled “patience and moderation” in the hope that
the South would achieve settlement of the issue more easily
than seemed possible at the moment.28 In Florida’s capital, the
Tallahassee Democrat remarked that the state had greeted the
court’s announcement of the illegality of segregation in a
“spirit of thoughtful calm.” The Democrat importuned Floridians to cooperate “in working out sound solutions to all problems presented in the spirit of calm common-sense so far in
evidence throughout Florida.“29
From these samples of editorial opinion it is obvious that
the reactions of Florida newspapers to the desegregation edict
were judicious. Five years after the May 17, 1954 decision, the
United States Commission on Civil Rights made precisely that
point, observing that “Southern papers generally applauded
the wisdom of the Court in postponing its decision on the ‘how’
and ‘when’ of desegregation.” Most editors sought calm, thoughtful consideration of the complex issues which the opinion
raised.30 That was clearly the case in Florida, where editors of
the more influential daily newspapers refrained from arousing
opposition to the Brown ruling.
Responses from other sources to the Brown case were as
sober as those of state newspapers. For example, Suntime, a
magazine devoted to promoting Florida tourism, noted simply
that the segregation question had come to the boiling point in
the South in 1954. Suntime’s outlook was that the South should
clear up the crisis itself, without what the publication called
“outside interference.“31 The Florida Education Association, a professional organization representing most of the white
public school teachers in the state, praised “the calm, investigative approach adopted by Florida on this [segregation] issue.”
Segregation was a “vital” problem, and the crisis which the
Brown ruling had aroused was “real,” but “rabble rousing”
would provide no answer. The state’s educational leaders had
thus far confronted the emergency with “sanity,” a development which demonstrated “the attainment of mature emotional
Tampa Morning Tribune, May 19, 1954.
Tallahassee Democrat, May 20, 1954.
U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1959 (Washington, 1960), 163.
31. “An Old, Old Story,” Suntime, VI (December 1954), 10.

28.
29.
30.
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attitudes” The Florida Congress of Parents and Teachers in
its 1954-1955 platform announced its support for “continuance
of the public school system.” It proposed “that problems attendant upon integration be solved through taking individual
and local group responsibility for building the requisite understanding and emotional climate.“33 Mrs. C. Durwood Johnson,
then president of the organization, warned that “citizens who
believe in education must make no attempt to circumvent” the
Brown decision; Florida’s main requirement in meeting the new
educational situation was time.34
Religious bodies likewise expressed their opinions of the
court’s action. The annual conference of the Florida Methodist
church, meeting shortly after the court released its verdict,
recognized the decision as constituting the “law of the land.”
A resolution declared that the edict provided the country with
an answer to the “powerful propaganda weapon that has been
used against us by the Communists.” It would strengthen
Christian missionaries working in foreign lands, and enhance
the position of the United States in its search for world peace.
The Methodists were aware that the decree’s total implementation might consume many years, and they called for patience
and good will. They particularly wanted all Christian churches
to offer the constructive leadership now demanded.35
The Florida Presbyterian Synod’s Division of Christian Relations recommended that trustees of colleges under its control
drop all racial barriers in the admission of students, that ministers lead in forming interracial committees in their communities
to “develop mutual understanding and good will,” and that the
Synod conform to the policy of the church’s general assembly
“that enforced segregation of the races is contrary to Christian
36
theology and . . . the best Christian practices.“ A splinter
group of sixteen members, opposing these recommendations,
32. “Continuing Education Council Report on Segregation,” 6.
33. “Article III, Section 6 of Proposed Platform for 1954-1955,” Florida
Parent-Teacher, XXVI (November 1954), 3; St. Petersburg Times, November 10, 1954.
34. Ibid., October 4, 1954.
35. Methodist Church of the United States, Florida Conference, Journal of
the Sixteenth Session of the Florida Annual Conference of the Methodist
Church (Lakeland, June 9-13, 1954), 144.
36. Presbyterian Church in the United States, Synod of Florida, Minutes of
the Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting (Orlando, September 20-22, 1955), 33.
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argued: “We believe the Bible teaches that God fashioned the
hearts of all men alike; yet God made the races distinct. We
further believe that since God made the races distinct it is
proper to recognize race, striving for a Godly pride in, and
purity of, races.“37
While Florida’s Protestant Episcopal Church did not specifically endorse the Brown ruling, the church at its annual
council noted that the increasing complexity of race relations
made imperative a wider knowledge of the church’s teachings.
Therefore, the council instructed its Department of Christian
Social Relations to inaugurate a program of “guidance and
education in the area of race relations.“38 The United Church
Women in Florida, representing Episcopal, Methodist, Christian, Baptist, and Presbyterian denominations, favored the
court’s action and advocated Florida’s participation in future
action on desegregation. 39 The Florida Council of Churches, a
body with membership from eight denominations, supported
the court’s action. It urged Floridians to adapt themselves to
the national will as expressed in the court’s opinion and cautioned against recognizing “artificial standards of race, nationality, or class which exist in society.“40 While the Disciples of
Christ Assembly of Florida asserted that racial integration was
a desirable goal which the church and its affiliated schools should
pursue, it somewhat apprehensively voiced the fear that the
end of segregation would be the death sentence for most church
related schools.41
Among labor groups, the Florida Congress of Industrial
Organizations advocated “common sense and good will” to
permit an “orderly transition” in effecting desegregation. The
body’s annual convention pledged “to strive for economic
equality, political equality, and an equal share of the facilities
afforded by the community for all persons, regardless of race,
religion, color or national origin.“42
United States Senator George Smathers predicted that the
37. Ibid., 34.
38. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., Florida Diocese, Journal of
the One Hundred and Twelfth Annual Council of the Diocese of
Florida (Jacksonville, January 25-27, 1955), 41,
39. St. Petersburg Times, September 22, 1954.
40. Ibid., October 14, 1954.
41. Ibid., October 31, 1954.
42. Ibid., September 6, 1954.
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decree would “have tremendous, far reaching results,” and that
it would be “wasteful” to attack the court’s decision which had
been reached unanimously. There was one bright spot in the
crisis, as he saw it; the date for the start of desegregation was
left open. The South could, of course, seek delay, but for the
moment Smathers called for “calm, clear thinking”: there
must be no “hasty decisions, no inflammatory statements based
on anger or resentment.“43 Senator Spessard Holland also urged
“patience and moderation” and hoped there would “not be
violent repercussions.” “This is a new law,” he cautioned,
“make no mistake about it, and it appears to be final.” He felt
that rapid desegregation would hurt the 70,000 southern black
teachers since it seemed likely that school boards would not
engage Negro teachers to instruct mixed classes.44
Congressman Charles E. Bennett of Jacksonville advised calm
and careful consideration. While he had favored segregated
schools and had never regarded segregation with equal facilities
as being unconstitutional, he predicted that “Florida and its
citizens of both races” would be able to solve its problems.45
Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes of Crestview called the ruling
detrimental, and claimed that it would seriously impair the
“orderly progress of southern education.” Although he thought
that the “good relations and mutual confidence now enjoyed
between races may be set back a generation,” he hoped “that
states will find workable and satisfactory solutions, so children
of both races may continue to be educated separately under
conditions which are better for the South.”46
When the court handed down the Brown opinion a hotly
contested Democratic gubernatorial primary race was underway in Florida. The leading candidates, Acting Governor
Charley Johns and State Senator LeRoy Collins, reacted, but
they did not attempt to make the court’s move an issue in the
campaign.47 Johns was in West Palm Beach when he learned of
the decision. After conferring with G. Warren Sanchez, one of
43. Tampa Morning Tribune, May 18, 1954; St. Petersburg Times, May 18,
1954; Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., C, Part 22, A5367-68.
44. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954; St. Petersburg Times,
May 18, 1954; Tampa Morning Tribune, May 17, 1954; Congressional
Quarterly (May 21, 1954), 637.
45. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954.
46. Ibid., May 19, 1954.
47. Southern School News, September 3, 1954.
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his advisors, he arranged a meeting of the state cabinet for the
following day. He also dispatched a message to Attorney General Richard W. Ervin, instructing him to study the ruling and
its application to the state. Johns indicated to the press that his
inclination at the moment was to call an extraordinary session of
the state legislature to consider the decree.48
Senator Collins was not so sparing with his commentary.
He had stressed repeatedly during the campaign his support of
segregation, regarding it as part of both custom and law in
Florida. Moreover, he felt it the governor’s duty under the
state constitution to maintain segregation, and he pledged that
if elected to use all legal power to keep the dual school system
intact. He urged the governor to “call together the best brains
in our state to study the situation and meet it calmly and properly— ” while there was still time for such action.49
The most detailed responses to the decision among state
officials came from Attorney General Ervin and Superintendent
Bailey. While the latter saw nothing surprising in the development, he called for “sober and careful thinking together with
planning untainted by hysteria.” Most vital was continuation
of the “phenomenal progress” which Florida schools had made
in the previous decade. The supreme court, in all probability,
would allow Florida time to prepare for desegregation. Rulings
which would emerge during the next court session would
naturally affect any plans the state might formulate. A few days
later, in a more defiant mood, Bailey admonished: “The greatest danger we have isn’t just the segregation issue. We have a
lot of people down here who hate to be pushed around, whether
the state or federal government is doing the pushing. If they
give us time, it will work out.“50
Attorney General Ervin remembered that the, Brown decision was not completely a surprise; he had already concluded
that the “separate but equal” doctrine would be reversed, but
he had thought the justices would rule that separate school
48.
49.
50.

Miami Herald, May 18, 1954; Washington Post, May 19, 1954; Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954; St. Petersburg Times, May
18, 1954.
Tallahassee Democrat, May 16, 18, 1954; Jacksonville Florida TimesUnion, May 18, 1954.
Miami Herald, May 18, 1954; Tallahassee Democrat, May 17, 1954;
Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 23, 1954.
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facilities could not be equal rather than base their decision on
psychological grounds.51 Ervin in 1954 stated publicly that he
anticipated no immediate disruption of the educational system;
he was confident of long delay before desegregation actually
became effective. Such delay would allow Florida to argue the
date and the conditions under which schools would desegregate. 52
Ervin and Bailey later supplemented their individual statements with a joint press release. This statement reiterated much
that had already been said, but it also noted that the court had
invited state attorney generals to file briefs by October 1954,
“in order to present the practical problems confronting the
states.” To prepare such a brief, school authorities, citizens
groups, and legislative committees would need to make surveys
and studies of the educational system. The findings would also
serve as a guide for the 1955 legislature in its actions.53
There was little public reaction from state legislators. Only
Representative F. W. Bedenbaugh of Lake City urged Acting
Governor Johns to call the legislature into session “to formulate
plans and pass laws necessary to retain segregation in public
schools of the state of Florida.“54 Senator J. Emory Cross of
Gainesville announced his opposition to efforts at abolishing
segregation in public schools, and he promised his vigorous
support for legislative measures to uphold segregation. Cross
believed the majority of both races desired maintenance of the
status quo; everyone, excepting minority group trouble-makers,
would agree on the impossibility of legislating social equality
or brotherhood or mutual respect between races.55
Representative Prentice P. Pruitt of Monticello later became
the most outspoken legislative champion of a dual school system.
As he remembered it the Brown decision came as no surprise.
The supreme court’s attitude toward racial questions had
become obvious over the years. Pruitt saw no need for a special
legislative session, and he doubted Acting Governor Johns’s
Richard W. Erwin to author, January 27, 1967.
St. Petersburg Times, May 18, 1954; Tallahassee Democrat, May 17, 1954;
Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954.
53. St. Petersburg Times, May 18, 1954.
54. Tampa Morning Tribune, May 18, 1954; Jacksonville Florida TimesUnion, May 18, 1954.
55. St. Petersburg Times, July 11, 1954.

51.
52.
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ability to provide strong leadership even if there was such a
session.56
J. Thomas Watson, former Democratic state attorney general and in 1954 a Republican candidate for governor, termed
the ruling inapplicable to Florida. The supreme court, he contended, had often recognized the supremacy of state courts in
deciding the validity of state constitutions. The tribunal had
“given such state courts’ interpretations supreme authority
over the matter involved in that particular state.“57 Obviously
Watson believed that the supreme court had now contradicted
itself on segregation.
A single state officer, Chairman Hollis Rinehart of the Board
of Control, which supervised the state university system, favored
immediate desegregation. He predicted that the Brown opinion
would affect every public school in the state, and he argued
that Florida should prepare for the entry of Negro students
into all levels of the white educational system. While emphasizing that he spoke only for himself, Rinehart argued that the
state could desegregate without black citizens having to go to
court, “providing white leaders take the necessary steps to
cooperate. ” “Our state,” he urged, should “face the issue squarely, honestly, and intelligently without litigation.“58
The impression which emerges from this survey is that
initially the reaction of Florida whites to the Brown case was
less extreme than in many other southern states. One cannot
avoid the conclusion that early responses were deceptive, that
they were only surface manifestations, and that beneath the
surface there existed a huge reservoir of potential resistance to
desegregation. The passage of time proved that such resistance
was a reality. As late as 1959 a committee engaged in drafting
a proposed new constitution for Florida persisted in retaining
the 1885 constitutional provision for racial segregation in
schools.59 Not until September 1959, did the first black children
56. Prentice P. Pruitt to author, January 31, 1967.
57. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 19, 1954.
58. Miami Herald, May 18, 1954; St. Petersburg Times, May 18, 1954; Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954; Tallahassee Democrat,
May 18, 1954.
59. Florida Constitution (1885), Art. XII, Sec. 12. The proposal to leave the
1885 requirement unchanged is in Florida Special Constitution Advisory
Committee to the Governor, The 1959 Recommended Constitution
(Tallahassee, 1959), 9.
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attend classes with whites in a public school— at Orchard Villa
School in Miami. Even then desegregation was only token.60
Florida had managed to delay even that meager beginning for
five years. As a further measure of the strength of resistance,
between 1954 and 1959 the Florida legislature approved twentyone laws designed to keep public schools segregated.61 Yet if
Florida did not live up to its potential for moderation and for
early compliance with the supreme court’s order, it did stop
short of the kind of massive resistance which developed in other
southern states.62
60.

61.
62.

Miami Herald, September 9, 1959. See also Florida Across the Threshold:
The Administration of Governor LeRoy Collins, January 4, 1955January 3, 1961 (Tallahassee, 1961), 54; U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Conference Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
Gatlinburg, Tennessee, March 21-22, 1960 (Washington, 1960), 118-19.
Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation: The First Decade (New
York, 1966), 357, 363.
For an excellent discussion of this point see Benjamin Muse, Ten Years
of Prelude: The Study of Integration Since the Supreme Court’s 1954
Decision (New York, 1964), 197-98.
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